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claim settlement practices fully reflect the impact of the
Garrity decision.
Both Garrity and Karl have clarified selected areas of the
law of subrogation. While these decisions have raised addi-
tional questions, on the whole they should provide a basis for
greater harmony and consistency in future decisions of the
court regarding subrogation. The lack of such consistency in




In the 1976 term the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed
a broad spectrum of municipal law issues. This article focuses
on five cases dealing with three of these issues: (1) the applica-
tion of the Wisconsin Constitution's home rule amendment to
both a state statute and a municipal ordinance, (2) interpreta-
tion of the Wisconsin Environmental Protection Act, and (3)
the local governmental body's role in implementing the direct
legislation statute. Each of the cases discussed below repre-
sents the court's first determination of the issue involved.
I. APPLICATION OF THE HOME RULE AMENDMENT
This term the court dealt with the distinction between mat-
ters of statewide concern and matters of local concern in two
very different contexts. City of Beloit v. Kallas' involved a
state statute aimed at pollution control, while State ex rel.
Michalek v. Le Grand2 involved a municipal ordinance aimed
at improving housing conditions. In each case, the challengers
unsuccessfully argued that statewide concerns were being sub-
jugated to local interests in contravention of Article XI, section
3 of the Wisconsin Constitution. This section, known as the
home rule amendment, provides in pertinent part:
Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law are hereby
empowered, to determine their local affairs and government,
subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of
1. 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W.2d 342 (1977).
2. 77 Wis. 2d 520, 253 N.W.2d 505 (1977).
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the legislature of state-wide concern as shall with uniformity
affect every city or every village.
Under this amendment, municipalities receive a direct grant of
legislative power, the exercise of which is subject only to legis-
lative enactments of statewide concern.
In City of Beloit v. Kallas eleven electors3 of the unincorpor-
ated area of the Town of Beloit challenged the constitutionality
of section 144.07(lm) 4 of the statutes. That section provides
that when the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) orders
connection of an unincorporated area to a city or village sewer
system, the city or village may commence annexation proceed-
ings. If the voters of the area to be annexed reject the annexa-
tion, the connection order will be voided. Plaintiffs were propo-
nents of a sewer connection order voided after annexation rejec-
tion.5 The annexation issue was never actually submitted to a
referendum but, in accordance with section 66.024(2) of the
Wisconsin Statutes, was rejected by a petition of a majority of
the voters of the area to be annexed.'
The plaintiffs contended, first, that the provision voiding
the sewer connection order upon annexation rejection violated
3. The circuit court for Dane County, pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 227.16(1) (1971)
named eleven electors of the unincorporated area of the Town of Beloit as proper
parties to challenge the constitutionality of § 144.07 (1m). In 1973 the issue of the
constitutionality of this same statute had been raised by the Department of Natural
Resources but the court refused to consider the issue because neither the agency nor
the other party, a municipality, had standing to raise the issue. City of Eau Claire v.
DNR, 60 Wis. 2d 751, 751-52, 210 N.W.2d 771, 771-72 (1973).
4. An order by the department for the connection of unincorporated territory
to a city or village system or plant under this section shall not become effective
for 30 days following issuance. Within 30 days following issuance of the order,
the governing body of a city or village subject to an order under this section may
commence an annexation proceeding under s. 66.024 to annex the unincorpor-
ated territory subject to the order. If the result of the referendum under s.
66.024(4) is in favor of annexation, the territory shall be annexed to the city or
village for all purposes, and sewerage service shall be extended to the territory
subject to the order. If an application for an annexation referendum is denied
under s. 66.024(2) or the referendum under s. 66.024(4) is against the annexa-
tion, the order shall be void. If an annexation proceeding is not commenced
within the 30-day period, the order shall become effective.
Wis. STAT. § 144.07(lm) (1975).
5. Following a pollution complaint, the Department of Natural Resources ordered
connection of the Town of Beloit to the City of Beloit sewerage transport and treatment
system. The city petitioned the circuit court for an annexation referendum which was
denied because of a petition by 62% of the town's voters opposing annexation. The city
then petitioned the court to declare the DNR connection order void. 76 Wis. 2d at 63,




the home rule amendment by making the state interest in pol-
lution control subject to a local concern. The court, however,
did not accept this categorization of state and local interests,
but rather found that both pollution control and annexation
were matters of statewide concern.' By determining that both
pollution control and urban development were statewide con-
cerns and proper subjects for legislation, the court eliminated
the possibility that the legislation would be found violative of
the home rule amendment.8
Secondly, plaintiffs challenged the provision permitting
annexation rejection by petition on the basis that there was no
guarantee that voters would be "apprised of the consequences
of their decision." 9 A referendum vote, and presumably the
petition procedure, could be found arbitrary and capricious if
based on insufficient or inaccurate information. 0 However, the
Kallas court found no lack of information but rather accepted
a presumption that the appropriate publicity was given and
that the reasons for the annexation proposal were known by the
voters who signed the petition rejecting annexation."
Whatever the actual notice in this case, the legislature
7. The court's broad statement that annexation is a vehicle for urban development
or expansion does not clarify what the state interest in urban development is. One
reason for state interest in annexation and urban development is that the fiscal and
political integrity of divisions of the state could be undermined if they were forced to
provide needed services to outlying areas wthout the concomitant benefits of incorpo-
rating those areas into their fiscal and political structures when desirable. See In re
City of Fond du Lac, 42 Wis. 2d 323, 333, 166 N.W.2d 225, 229 (1969).
8. Even accepting the plaintiffs' categorization of interests, the court could have
reached the same result. The inquiry, then, would have been whether the effect of the
annexation rejection contravened the home rule amendment by "assigning a right to
block advancement of paramount interests, [or whether it was a permissible] delega-
tion of a limited authority or responsibility to further proper public interests." Minzer
v. Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d 70, 78, 186 N.W.2d 290, 294 (1971).
9. Brief for Appellant at 23, City of Beloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W.2d
342 (1977).
10. In Wisconsin, notice of referenda "shall contain the entire text of the referen-
dum questions and an explanatory statement of the effect of either a yes or no vote."
Wis. STAT. § 10.01(2)(c) (1975).
11. According to appellant's brief, a substantial number of people attempted to
withdraw their names from the petition against annexation when they realized that
their signatures had the effect of voiding the sewerage connection order. Brief for
Appellant at 23, 24. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the issue had
not been raised at the circuit court level and therefore should not be considered. Brief
for Petitioner-Respondent at 30. Amicus Curiae argued that notice is ordinarily pre-
sumed and that a public hearing and notices coupled with the juxtaposition of issues
was presumptively sufficient. It was this argument of presumption and of implied
knowledge upon which the court relied in its opinion.
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should recognize that the use of section 66.024(2), whereby
annexation can be rejected by petition without a formal vote
of the electorate, could thwart the legislative accommodation
of competing public interests reflected in section 144.07(lm).
If the end result of the statutory procedures is to effectively
reflect the legislature's concerns, it is critical that the voters
have adequate notice of the implications of their annexation
decision. This notice could be achieved by removal of section
66.024(2) as an option for rejection of annexation in this situa-
tion or by a requirement that any petition contain a statement
-fully explaining the reasons for the referenda and the effect of
signing the petition.
State ex rel. Michalek v. Le Grand12 arose when the building
inspector of the City of Milwaukee refused to implement a
Milwaukee ordinance 3 permitting rent withholding in an es-
crow account pending removal of city building and zoning code
violations. Inspector Le Grand's refusal was based on the prem-
ise that the rent withholding ordinance might violate the Wis-
consin Constitution's home rule amendment. 4 The petitioner-
tenant brought a mandamus action to compel the rent with-
holding but the court refused to issue the writ on the basis that
the ordinance was unconstitutional. 5 On appeal, the supreme
court reversed.
In situations where legislation does not fall neatly into the
statewide concern or local concern classifications, such a deter-
mination must be made by the courts." In Michalek the court
found that the subject of the ordinance was "primarily and
paramountly . ..a matter of the 'local affairs and govern-
ment' of [the] city and, as such, authorized by the home rule
amendment to the state constitution."' 7 Once it had made this
determination, the court easily dismissed the three arguments
against the ordinance. It found no conflict between the local
rent withholding ordinance and a state statute" providing that
residential buildings not complying with local building codes
12. 77 Wis. 2d 520, 253 N.W.2d 505 (1977).
13. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 51-4(1) (1976).
14. 77 Wis. 2d at 525, 253 N.W.2d at 506. The home rule amendment is found in
WIs. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
15. 77 Wis. 2d at 525, 253 N.W.2d at 506.
16. Id. at 527-28, 253 N.W.2d at 507.
17. Id. at 528-29, 253 N.W.2d at 508.
18. Wis. STAT. § 280.22 (1975).
1977]
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may be declared a public nuisance and providing for the ap-
pointment of a receiver to collect rents and apply those monies
to necessary building repairs. Rather, the court found, these
were parallel and complementary pieces of legislation reflect-
ing both "a valid exercise of municipal lawmaking authority
under the home rule amendment and . . . a valid enactment
of the state legislature in a field of statewide concern." 9 Simi-
larly, the court found no conflict between the ordinance and
the landlord tenant statutes dealing with termination of tenan-
cies for failure to pay rent. 0 Finally, the court found that the
rent withholding ordinance did not violate the notice and hear-
ing requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 1 "[T]he ordinance as drafted ensures that no
landlord or lessor will be deprived of his property interests
without a full opportunity fo challenge the proposed rent with-
holding action before it is undertaken. '2
Neither Kallas nor Michalek dealt with matters of exclu-
sively statewide or exclusively local concern.2 3 In these cases
the court's attempt to classify the concerns was a pragmatic
response to the language of the home rule amendment, but the
court clearly recognized the overlap of state and local inter-
ests.2
4
19. 77 Wis. 2d at 530, 253 N.W.2d at 508-09.
20. Wis. STAT. § 704.17 (1975). The possibility of conflict with § 704.07, which
allows rent abatement for the untenantable portion of the premises, was not addressed.
If the interest were of statewide concern, such a conflict would have been pertinent.
However, because of the determination that the ordinance dealt with an issue of local
affairs, state legislation could neither pre-empt the field nor be considered paramount.
77 Wis. 2d at 529, 253 N.W.2d at 508.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. 77 Wis. 2d at 536, 253 N.W.2d at 511. The landlord has 20 days to request a
hearing after notice of the existence of code violations. Such a request automatically
postpones rent withholding until after the hearing at which the lessor may appear
personally and present evidence and witnesses. At the hearing the burden of establish-
ing violations is on the building inspector.
23. The exact boundary lines of the field of the "local affairs" of cities or
villages we shall not now undertake to delimit. Solution of the possible difficul-
ties in determining when the narrower and particular term "local affairs" is or
is not within the more general and wider term of "state-wide concern," and the
possible query whether such terms involve conflict or contradiction, must also
all be left to the future.
The words "local affairs and government" are perhaps, and in one view of
the matter, a rather unfortunate choice of language.
State ex rel. Ekern v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 638, 209 N.W. 860, 861 (1926).
24. The significance of the problems addressed by the legislation is recognized in
court discussion of the proper exercise of the police power, and of judicial deference to
[Vol. 61:279
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II. INTERPRETATION OF THE WISCONSIN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION ACT
Two cases this term construed that portion of the Wisconsin
Environmental Protection Act (WEPA) which sets forth the
environmental impact statement (EIS) requirements with
which agencies of the state must comply prior to legislative
enactments or "other major actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. 2 5 In Robinson v. Kunach2
the court pointed out a major gap in the application of the Act.
The case arose when Oneida County initiated condemnation
proceedings for the proposed relocation of a county road onto
land owned by the plaintiff.Y The crucial issue, addressed by
both the briefs and the court, was whether the term "agency
of the state" as used in section 1.11(2)(c) of WEPA included
local governmental units such as counties. After determining
that the clause was ambiguous as used, the court turned to
legislative history for guidance.
Three factors led the court to conclude that the statute was
not intended to apply to counties: no fiscal note, as required
legislative determinations of what laws "are reasonably required to protect the public
safety." 76 Wis. 2d at 67-68, 250 N.W.2d at 345-46.
25. Wis. STAT. § 1.11(2)(c) (1975) provides:
(2) All agencies of the state shall:
(c) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement, substantially following the guidelines issued by the
United States council on environmental quality under P.L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C.
4331, by the responsible official on:
1. The environmental impact of the proposed action;
2. Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
3. Alternatives to the proposed action;
4. The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
5. Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented;
6. Such statement shall also contain details of the beneficial aspects of the
proposed project, both short term and long term, and the economic advantages
of the proposal.
26. 76 Wis. 2d 436, 251 N.W.2d 449 (1977).
27. Federal revenue sharing funds were allocated for the relocation. This use of
federal funds, channelled through a federal agency, is not sufficient to be considered
federal action which could trigger the application of the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 etseq. (1970). See, e.g., No. E.-W. Highway Comm'n, Inc.
v. Whitaker, 403 F. Supp. 260 (D. N.H. 1975); Nodell Inv. Corp. v. Colman, 396 F.
Supp. 1341, 1343 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
19771
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by section 13.10, was included;28 there was no specific defini-
tion of the term "agency of the state," as found in the soil and
water conservation statutes;29 nor was there any history of ap-
plication of the statute to counties by administrative agen-
cies.30 Thus, county highway projects and other county public
works are not subject to the Act, regardless of the potential
impacts."
In Wisconsin Environmental Decade v. Public Service
Commission,3" the court determined the breadth of the applica-
tion of the same statute when an agency of the state is involved.
The conflict between Wisconsin Environmental Decade
(WED) and the Public Service Commission (PSC) arose over
whether it is necessary to prepare an environmental impact
statement prior to authorizing an increase in electric power
rates.Y Contending that the impact of the order was economic,
and that any environmental effects would be "remote and indi-
rect," 34 the PSC issued the rate increase order involved without
an environmental impact statement. The commission also con-
tended that the statement was not warranted because there
was no evidence that conclusions reached would be "based on
anything other than pure speculation." 3 The trial court found
that the PSC had not sufficiently considered environmental
factors prior to making its no-impact determination and re-
manded the matter for further investigation to determine
whether an impact statement should be prepared. Both the
PSC and the power company appealed the decision and ques-
tioned the appropriate standard for judicial review of the PSC's
decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement.3 6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court construed the purpose of
WEPA in light of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), upon which the Wisconsin Act is patterned. The
court said,
28. 76 Wis. 2d at 444-45, 251 N.W.2d at 452.
29. Id. at 445-46, 436 N.W.2d at 452-53.
30. Id. at 446-48, 436 N.W.2d at 453-54.
31. Id. at 448, 436 N.W.2d at 454.
32. 79 Wis. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 149 (1977).
33. The Wisconsin Electric Power Company requested the increase "so as to be
'made whole' for increases in taxes, depreciation, the cost of money and other operating
costs occurring subsequent to a [previous] rate order of the Commission." Id. at 412,
256 N.W.2d at 152.
34. Id. at 413, 256 N.W.2d at 152.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 414, 256 N.W.2d at 153.
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[t]he threshold decision whether to prepare an EIS occupies
a critical position within the context of WEPA's operation. A
negative determination at the initial stage may eliminate to
a significant degree environmental consideration by the
agency.. . . It is obvious that achievement of WEPA's goals
will be significantly compromised if ill-advised determina-
tions not to prepare an EIS are permitted by the courts to
stand. Thus a consideration of the manner in which WEPA
was intended to function dictates a liberal approach to the
threshold decision of whether the impact statement should be
prepared."
The court also recognized that the administrative and techni-
cal costs of preparation, as well as lack of familiarity with
environmental analysis, might prompt an agency subjectively
and "in complete good faith" to be biased toward a negative
conclusion as to the necessity of an environmental impact
statement.3
8
The court adopted the standard of reasonableness found in
federal cases interpreting NEPA and held that "[w]here is-
sues of arguably significant environmental import are raised
• . . the agency must show justification for its negative-EIS
decision. '3 Significantly, the court accepted WED's conten-
tion that, in order to comply with the statutory mandate to
determine whether or not an impact statement is warranted, a
state agency must look to both the direct and the indirect
effects of a proposed action. "Any construction limiting the Act
to direct environmental effects would be contrary to its mani-
fest intent."4
Thus, although the court's construction of the Wisconsin
Environmental Protection Act in Robinson v. Kunach" has
severely limited the entities subject to the law, once an entity
is found subject to the law, as in Wisconsin Environmental
Decade,42 the court has broadly defined the duty to consider the
37. Id. at 419, 256 N.W.2d at 155.
38. Id. at 420, 256 N.W.2d at 155.
39. Id. at 424, 256 N.W.2d at 157.
40. Id. at 430, 256 N.W.2d at 160.
41. 76 Wis. 2d 436, 251 N.W.2d 449 (1977).
42. 79 Wis. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 149 (1977). The court's decision in this case is far
more detailed in its analysis than this discussion indicates. However, since it is not,
in the strictest sense, a municipal law case, the discussion herein has been limited.
The case has been included in the municipal law term because of the aspects in which
it complements the discussion of Wis. STAT. § 1.11(2)(c) (1975) in Robinson v. Kunach.
19771
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environmental impact of proposed governmental activities and
to prepare environmental impact statements where appropri-
ate.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECT LEGISLATION STATUTE
In another area of municipal law, the court dealt with the
obligation of a municipal legislative body to submit legislation
proposed under the direct legislation statute to a referendum,
despite legislative doubts as to the constitutionality of the leg-
islation. In State ex rel. Althouse v. Madison43 the voters of the
City of Madison had presented a petition for enactment of a
Fair Rent Ordinance to the council. According to the direct
legislation statute, the municipal legislative body could have
voted on the proposal and enacted it into law, but failing enact-
ment, the law required that the proposal be submitted to a
referendum.4 Based on the advice of the city attorney, the city
council concluded that the proposed Fair Rent Ordinance was
"in violation of state statutes and. . . unconstitutional,"45 and
thus had not submitted it to a vote of the electorate."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court examined conflicting pre-
cedent in Wisconsin and other jurisdictions. It held that the
city council had gone beyond its powers by improperly making
43. 79 Wis. 2d 97, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977). As a result of this decision the proposed
ordinance was submitted to referendum on Sept. 7, 1977. It was resoundingly defeated
by a vote of 46,916 to 7,893. Information supplied by City Clerk, City of Madison,
Wisconsin.
44. Wis. STAT. § 9.20 (1975) provides in pertinent part:
Direct legislation. (1) A number of electors equal to at least 15% of the
votes cast for governor at the last general election in their city may sign and file
a petition with the city clerk requesting that an attached proposed ordinance
or resolution, without alteration, either be adopted by the common council or
referred to a vote of the electors. The person filing the petition shall designate
in writing a person or organization to be notified of any insufficiency or improper
form under sub. (3).
(4) The common council shall, without alteration, either pass the ordi-
nance or resolution with 30 days following the date of the clerk's final certificate,
or submit it to the electors at the next spring or general election, if the election
is more than 6 weeks after the date the order is given. If 6 weeks or less before
election the ordinance or resolution shall be voted on at the next election there-
after. The council by a three-fourths vote of the members-elect may order a
special election for the purpose at any time prior to the next election, but not
more than one special election for direct legislation shall be called in any 6-
month period.
45. 79 Wis. 2d at 102, 225 N.W.2d at 451.
46. Id. at 103, 255 N.W.2d at 451.
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a judicial determination of unconstitutionality,47 and con-
cluded that,
where there has been no specific prior adjudication of uncon-
stitutionality, the electorate under the direct legislation stat-
utes, may compel placement on the ballot regardless of grave
doubts in respect to constitutionality and statutory validity.
Only after the measure has passed and a controversy arises
may a court of this state pass upon the question of constitu-
tionality."
Section 9.20 is based upon the reserved legislative powers
of the electorate49 and has priority over the legislative discre-
tion of the city council. The city council may take into account
the possibility of conflict with state statutes or of unconstitu-
tionality of the proposal when it initiates legislation. However,
the council is statutorily obligated to either enact the measure
itself or to submit it to a public vote when, as in this case, the
reserved powers of the electorate are involved."0 Thus, under
the direct legislation statute, no determination of constitution-
ality is appropriate before the electorate has voted.5 Issues of
statutory conflict and constitutionality are to be dealt with by




In Falkner v. Northern States Power Co.,' the court af-
firmed the controversial taking of farm land by a Wisconsin
public corporation2 for the future construction' of a large nu-
47. Id. at 110, 255 N.W.2d at 455.
48. Id. at 117-18, 255 N.W.2d at 458.
49. Id. at 118-19, 255 N.W.2d at 459.
50. Id. at 110, 255 N.W.2d at 455.
51. Id. at 119, 255 N.W.2d at 459.
52. Id.
1. 75 Wis. 2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977).
2. Power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty which may be delegated
to a corporation by the legislature. Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans, 85 Wis. 26, 39, 54
N.W. 1003 (1893); Wis. STAT. § 32.02(6) (1975).
3. At trial the estimated completion dates of the units were April 1982, and October
1977]
